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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines play a central role in the sentencing of
federal criminal defendants. A decade ago, in United States v. Booker,' the
Supreme Court undercut the original purpose for the Guidelines-to bring
binding structure to a previously discretionary sentencing scheme-by declaring
that the Guidelines were advisory only.2 Henceforth, judges were no longer

J.D. 2012, Duke University School of Law; B.A. 2007, The Johns Hopkins University. Many
thanks to Kathryn Drenning and Bryan Leitch for their comments. The views and opinions
expressed herein are solely those of the Author and not any other entity.

1.
2.

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
See id. at 233-35, 244 (2005) (holding that mandatory application of the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment); id. at 245 (remedying the constitutional
infirmity by making the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory). Much ink has been spilled
discussing the pre-Booker, mandatory Guidelines era, including, for example, Frank 0. Bowman III,
The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 690-704, and Katie Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
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bound by the sentencing ranges prescribed by the Guidelines. Instead, judges
were to consider the Guidelines as one of several statutory factors before
exercising their discretion to select a sentence that was "sufficient, but not
greater than necessary." 3
Even though advisory, the Guidelines remain at the procedural heart of the
sentencing process and provide "the framework for sentencing."4 All sentencing
proceedings in the district court begin with the proper calculation of the advisory
Guidelines range. Similarly, on review, the courts of appeals initially determine
whether the sentencing process was free of procedural errors, including whether
6
the advisory Guidelines range was correctly calculated.
The framework of the law often affects its output, and federal sentencing
would appear to be no exception. But what happens when form may not affect
substance?
After all, the Guidelines are no longer the beginning and end of a sentencing
hearing. A district court may not facilely presume that a Guidelines sentence is
appropriate.
Rather, a defendant's advisory Guidelines range is but one of
several important factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that a sentencing
court must consider.8 Consideration of the other section 3553(a) factors-which
include the need "to promote respect for the law," "to afford adequate
deterrence," and "to protect the public" from the defendant-may prove more
persuasive, if not determinative, in a particular sentencing.9
In such a case, when other, non-Guidelines considerations clearly steered the
sentencing court's discretion, should it matter whether the advisory Guidelines
range was correctly calculated in the first place? Provided certain elements are
met, the Fourth Circuit would answer no. This is an exception to the principle

3.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); see Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges,
Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1480-81 (2008) ("While the
Guidelines remain extant, the remedy in Booker alters the status of the Guidelines significantly and
opens the possibility of an evolving sentencing law that draws on the judgment and experience of
sentencing judges themseleves.").
4.
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013); see id. at 2084 (referring to the
Guidelines as "the lodestone of sentencing"); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007) ("As
a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the
starting point and the initial benchmark.").
5.
See, e.g., Gall, 551 U.S. at 49 ("[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings
by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.").
6.
See, e.g., Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083 ("Indeed, the rule that an incorrect Guidelines
calculation is procedural error ensures that they remain the starting point for every sentencing
calculation in the federal system."); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
7.
Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam).
8.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)); see also Stith, supra
note 3, at 1489 (noting that the Supreme Court's post-Booker cases "explicitly affirm the important
role of the sentencing judge, not simply finding facts that the Guidelines provide are relevant to
punishment, but in judging the statutory purposes of sentencing including the justness of
punishment in the case at hand").
9.
See § 3553(a) (setting forth the factors to be considered by district courts when imposing
sentence).
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that an improperly calculated advisory Guidelines range constitutes a significant
procedural error, meriting that a sentence be vacated.' 0
This Article examines the Fourth Circuit's emergent and evolving doctrine
of alternate variance sentences." Under this doctrine, a sentence will not be
vacated even if the sentencing court may have erred when calculating the
advisory Guidelines range.1 2 If it is clear from the record that an advisory
Guidelines issue did not influence the ultimate sentence, the appellate panel will
assume any Guidelines errors are harmless and proceed to evaluate whether the
sentence is substantively reasonable.13
At first glance, the doctrine might seem to involve nothing more than the
elimination of a little bit of formalism from the sentencing review process. In
fact, its increasingly frequent application has a significant impact on all actors in
the federal criminal sentencing process-prosecutors, defense counsel,
defendants, and judges. Moreover, the doctrine implicates important debates
about the meaning and effect of the Guidelines after Booker, the distribution of
power between district and appellate judges in sentencing, and judicial
efficiency.
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part I briefly outlines the process
followed by district and appellate courts in imposing and reviewing sentences.
Part II introduces and provides the initial contours of the doctrine. Part III
incorporates subsequent developments in the Fourth Circuit and describes the
current state of the doctrine. Part IV discusses the important normative
considerations implicated by alternate variance sentences, including the
doctrine's potential criticisms and defenses. Finally, the Article concludes.
II.

PROCESS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING

This Part contextualizes the doctrine of alternate variance sentences by
briefly detailing the sentencing minuet followed by district and appellate judges.
Although this Part describes a routine well known to judges and federal criminal
practitioners, it is this process that led to the doctrine's rise and which the
doctrine in turn has influenced.

10. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 260 (4th Cir. 2008) ("A sentence based
on an improperly calculated guidelines range will be found unreasonable and vacated.").
11. As a matter of nomenclature, Fourth Circuit Judge Dennis Shedd used the term "alternate
variance sentence" in his concurring opinion in United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 620
(4th Cir. 2010) (Shedd, J., concurring).
12. See generally id. at 620 (citing United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir.
2006) ("Applying [the] analysis to the facts before it, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that even if
there was any misapplication of the guideline enhancement, 'the error did not affect the district
court's selection of the sentence imposed.')).
13. See id. (citing United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2010)).
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Upon a defendant's entry of a guilty plea or conviction after trial, the district
judge schedules a sentencing hearing for a future date.1 4 In the interim, the
United States Probation Office prepares a presentence report about the defendant
for the court, which, among other things, details the defendant's conduct, history,
and characteristics and calculates the defendant's advisory Guidelines range with
any applicable enhancements, adjustments, and departures.' 5
At the sentencing hearing, the district court begins "by considering the
presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines.' 6 As a practical
matter, the court usually starts by resolving any objections raised by the
government, the defendant, or the court itself to the Presentence Report and the
Guidelines calculation.' 7 These objections may be factual (such as whether
evidence supports applying a particular Guidelines provision in a case), or legal
(such as Guidelines provision's broader construction).
To resolve these
objections-particularly factual objections-the court may need to receive
exhibits or hear from witnesses to make its factual findings. As a result, debates
about some advisory Guidelines provisions may become like mini-trials.
Having resolved any objections to the presentence report, the court must
calculate the defendant's Guidelines range.' 8 The Guidelines calculation is itself
an eight-step process that begins with determining the applicable offense
guideline, moves through the offense level, enhancements and adjustments, and
ends with sentencing options.19 The court then considers any motions to depart
upward or downward from the Guidelines range,20 before announcing the final,
advisory Guidelines range.

14. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b) ("The court must impose sentence without unnecessary
delay.").
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)-(d).
16. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3). However, the court need not rule on an
objection if the "matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter
in sentencing." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
17. See Evans, 526 F.3d at 160; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3). However, the court need
not rule on an objection if "matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider
the matter in sentencing." Id. 32(i)(3)(B).
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2012) (requiring a district court to consider at sentencing the
applicable Guidelines range).
19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB1.1(a) (2014). Depending upon when
the offense conduct occurred and whether the relevant Guidelines provisions have been amended, a
court may have to compare several different versions of the Guidelines. See Peugh v. United States,
133 S.Ct. 2072, 2078 (2013) (requiring, to avoid ex post facto violation, determination of whether
Guidelines version in effect at the time of sentencing "provides a higher applicable Guidelines
sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense").
20. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(b); see also id. §§ 5Kl.1-5K3.1 (listing various grounds for departure).
Although the difference between a departure and a variance is less material after Booker and the
steps often are conflated, they remain distinct steps.
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With the Guidelines calculation complete, the court addresses the factors
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.21 This step allows the court to consider a
number of broader, often intangible elements like the need for the sentence "to
promote respect for the law," "to protect the public," and "to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities." 22 When considering the section 3553(a) factors, the court
also may determine whether it should impose a variance sentence from that
23
recommended by the advisory Guidelines range. Finally, the court pronounces
a sentence.
In the event of an appeal, the appellate court reviews all sentences for both
procedural and substantive reasonableness under the "abuse-of-discretion
,,24
standard.
The court always begins with procedural reasonableness, which
"evaluates the method used to determine the defendant's sentence."2 5 Procedural
errors include "failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [section]
3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range." 26 Most relevant here, the Fourth Circuit
has recognized that sentences "based on an improperly calculated [G]uidelines
range will be found unreasonable and vacated."27
If the district court "committed no significant procedural error," the
appellate court proceeds to review the sentence for substantive reasonableness.28
Substantive reasonableness review "examines the totality of the circumstances to
see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in [section] 3553(a)."29 It is not
enough to vacate a sentence if the appellate court would have imposed a different
sentence. 30 Even for sentences that vary from the Guidelines, the court looks to
whether the district court's analysis of the section 3553(a) factors justified the
variance, but still owes due deference to the district court's decision. 31 However,

21. See id. § IBl.1(c) (instructing that the court move on to the section 3553(a) factors only
after it has completed the Guidelines calculation).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c), (a)(6).
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714-15 (2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 345 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at

27.
28.
29.
30.

United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 260 (4th Cir. 2008).
Morace, 594 F.3d at 345 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d at 216 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
See United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at

31.

See United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 365-66 (4th Cir. 2011); Evans, 526

51).

51).
F.3d at 162 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51) (observing that the amount of justification depends on the
size of the variance).
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if after giving due deference to the district court, a sentence still found to be
32
substantively unreasonable will be vacated.
III. ESTABLISHING A DOCTRINE

This Part explores the trio of cases that firmly established the doctrine of
alternate variance sentences in Fourth Circuit jurisprudence. The final case of
the trio also featured the first robust dissent to the doctrine.
A.

United States v. Savillon-Matute

The doctrine of alternate variance sentences was established in the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Savillon-Matute.33 In Savillon-Matute, the defendant,
who had been convicted of illegal reentry into the United States, challenged
whether his prior Maryland state court assault conviction triggered an eight-level
enhancement under the Guidelines as a "aggravated felony" or a sixteen-level
enhancement as a "crime of violence."34 The district court ultimately applied the
eight-level enhancement, calculated the Guidelines range to be 12-18 months,
and sentenced the defendant to 36 months' imprisonment, but not before
navigating a difficult stretch of jurisprudence about how to analyze the
Guidelines enhancement issue.35
Aside from the Guidelines calculation, the sentencing court explicitly tied its
sentence to the section 3553(a) factors. 36 Among other things, the district judge
stated that it "may be the first time" he would "go upward" under section
3553(a) because "there comes a point when enough is enough." 37
The
sentencing court concluded "a three year sentence is absolutely the appropriate
sentence in this case." 38
On appeal, the defendant argued that the court erroneously applied the eightlevel enhancement to calculate his Guidelines range. 39 But the Fourth Circuit
declined to "wad[e] into the morass" necessary to resolve the Guidelines issue
40
because it did not affect the outcome of the case.

32. See United States v. Heath, 559 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.
Curry, 523 F.3d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 2008)).
33. 636 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Although established in Savillon-Matute, the doctrine was
introduced to the Fourth Circuit by Fourth Circuit Judge Dennis Shedd in two concurring opinions.
See United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 619-22 (4th Cir. 2010) (Shedd, J., concurring);
United States v. Lee, 321 F. App'x 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring). Judge Shedd
became the agent of his own success when he authored the opinion for the court in Savillon-Matute.
34. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 121-22.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 122.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 123.
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Instead, the Savillon-Matute court established a doctrinal framework to elide
the Guidelines issue. The doctrinal foundation rests upon standards of review
broadly applicable to sentencing issues. Procedural errors during sentencing,
including miscalculations of the Guidelines range, "are routinely subject to
harmlessness review." 4 ' When conducting harmless error review, the Fourth
Circuit "commonly assume[s], without deciding, an error."4 2 A "[s]entencing
error is harmless if the resulting sentence is not longer than that to which the
defendant would otherwise be subject.,43
Upon the assumed harmless error standards, the Savillon-Matute court
erected two doctrinal requirements. First, the appellate court needs "knowledge
that the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided
the guidelines issue the other way." 44 Under section 3553(a), the district court
45
possesses the authority to impose a sentence irrespective of the Guidelines, So
the appellate court needs sufficient indicia that this authority is being invoked.
Second, the appellate court assumes without deciding that the defendant
correctly alleges error in the Guidelines calculation, 46 and "determin[es] that the
sentence would be reasonable even if the guidelines issue had been decided in
the defendant's favor." 47 Through this requirement, the appellate court engages
in its normal exercise of substantive reasonableness review, but it does so with

41.

Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141 (2009)). See, e.g., Williams v.

United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (stating, before Booker, "once the court of appeals has
decided that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless the
reviewing court concludes, on the record as a whole, that the error was harmless, i.e., that the error
did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed"); United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing harmlessness review of alleged procedural sentencing
errors). The Supreme Court's recent Peugh decision also acknowledges that Guidelines-related

errors may be harmless. See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2088 n.8 (2013) ("There may
be cases in which the record makes clear that the District Court would have imposed the same
sentence under the older, more lenient Guidelines that it imposed under the newer, more punitive
ones. In such a case, the ex post facto error may be harmless.").

42.
43.

Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 123.
United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.

Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (alterations and internal quotations omitted)); see, e.g.,
Williams, 503 U.S. at 203 (stating that if the party defending the sentence persuades the court of
appeals that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous or
harmless factor, then the court of appeals may affirm the sentencing so long as it is reasonable).

44.

Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 123 (quoting United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349

(11th Cir. 2006)). In Keene, the Eleventh Circuit provided the model for the Fourth Circuit. Id.
Through Savillon-Matute and its progeny though, the Fourth Circuit has developed its own distinct
understanding of how the doctrine applies to sentencing appeals.

45.

See Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349.

46. See Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 124 (noting, at the second stage, "we initially give
[Savillon-Matute] the benefit of the doubt and assume" the Guidelines range was as he alleged); see

also United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 622 (4th Cir. 2010) (Shedd, J., concurring)
(discussing how an application of the doctrine involves "initially giv[ing] [the defendant] the benefit
of the doubt and assume (without deciding) that he is correct" about the Guidelines range).

47.

Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 123 (quoting Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349).
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the understanding that the sentence imposed may vary from that advised by the
Guidelines.
Applying those two requirements to the case at hand, the Savillon-Matute
court found them satisfied. First, although the sentencing court "did not
specifically state that it would give the same sentence absent the 8-level
enhancement, there is no requirement that it do so." 4 8 The appellate panel was
satisfied by the sentencing judge's repeated and "consistent" statements that "it
'absolutely' believed" the sentence was appropriate.49 With that, the panel was
free to assume error and elide any need to resolve the contested Guidelines issue.
Second, the court assumed the defendant's Guidelines range should not have
included the eight-level enhancement and examined whether a variance sentence
from that lower Guidelines range to the sentence as pronounced was
substantively reasonable. 50 Given the defendant's record and the district court's
lengthy sentencing colloquy, the Savillon-Matute court had no trouble affirming
the sentence.'
The primary rationale for the doctrine cited by the Savillon-Matute court was
judicial efficiency. The court disclaimed the necessity or sensibility of setting
aside an ultimately reasonable sentence and remanding "the case back to the
district court since it has already told us that it would impose exactly the same
sentence, a sentence we would be compelled to affirm." 52 Thus, through this
approach, the Fourth Circuit expedites review by avoiding potentially complex
Guidelines issues and the district court avoids a remand and resentencing for the
same defendant.
B.

United States v. Hargrove

The next year, the Fourth Circuit returned to the topic of alternate variance
sentences in United States v. Hargrove.53 In Hargrove, the defendant, who had
been convicted of running a large dogfighting operation, challenged the district
court's application of enhancements for his planning of and role in the offense
and for the offense's victims, all of which raised his Guidelines range from 0-6
months to 41-51 months.54 The district court rejected the defendant's arguments
and further moved upward to impose a statutory maximum 60-month sentence.

48. Id. at 124.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012).
54. See id. at 159-60. The district court made clear, too, that it disagreed with the leniency of
the Guidelines' treatment of dogfighting as a policy matter. See id. at 160-61; see also Spears v.
United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009) (acknowledging district courts may vary from a
Guidelines provision "based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines").
55. See id. at 160. Although there was some ambiguity about whether the district court
departed upward under the Guidelines or varied upward under its section 3553 authority, the precise
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The district court made clear the deliberateness of its action: "If I had sustained
the Defendant's objections and come up with a Guideline range that the
Defendant did not object to, I would still have imposed both the upward
departure to 60 months and an upward variance to 60 months."56
On appeal, the defendant renewed his challenge to the Guidelines
enhancements, and the government conceded the district court incorrectly
calculated the Guidelines range.
However, the government cited SavillonMatute and argued that any Guidelines errors were harmless.
The Fourth
Circuit agreed.59
Before reaching the merits, the Hargrove court addressed two challenges to
the doctrine's scope. First, the defendant argued for a narrow interpretation of
Savillon-Matute that did not apply beyond "the unique circumstances of that
case." 60 The court declined to adopt such a construction and found SavillonMatute "indistinguishable from this case." 6' The court observed that "the
broader question before us [in Savillon-Matute] was the reasonableness of the
sentence in light of the defendant's claim that his guideline range was
miscalculated," the same argument now raised in Hargrove.62
Second, the defendant challenged alternate variance sentences generally as
disincentivizing district judges from carrying out their duty to correctly calculate
the Guidelines and, by tolerating procedural errors, corrupting the sentencing
63
process, which could lead to unreasonable sentences.
The Hargrove court
rejected this challenge as well. The court explained that its approach "does not
allow district courts to ignore their responsibility to consider the guidelines in a
meaningful manner when sentencing a defendant." 64 Moreover, far from
corrupting the sentencing process by tolerating errors, the doctrine is used only
"in appropriate circumstances . . . where it is clear that an asserted guideline

miscalculation did not affect the ultimate sentence."65
Satisfied of the doctrine's propriety, the Hargrove court applied it. The
court had "no difficulty" concluding from the district court's express statements
at sentencing that it would have pronounced the same sentence no matter the
Guidelines calculation.66 The court assumed a Guidelines range of 0-6 months

means are immaterial. See id. at 160 n.1; see also United States v. Diosado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 365
(4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2008)).
56. Hargrove, 701 F.3d at 160.
57. Id. at 161.
58. Id. (citing United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123-24 (4th Cir. 2010)).
59. Id. at 158.
60. Id. at 162.
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id.
63. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 8-9, United States v. Hargrove, 703 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
2012) (No. 11-4818), 2012 WL 730016, at *12-13.
64. Hargrove, 703 F.3d at 163.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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as argued by the defendant and analyzed whether a variance upward to the
67
statutory maximum sentence of 60 months was substantively reasonable.
After
reviewing the rationale of the district court, which stressed the defendant's longterm "barbaric" conduct and "life of cruelty," the court affirmed the sentence.68
The brevity of the opinion section actually applying the doctrine (a little over
one Federal Reporter page) served as a testimonial to its primary rationaleincrease judicial efficiency.
C.

United States v. Gomez-Jimenez

Savillon-Matute and Hargrove might have carved out a place for the
doctrine in Fourth Circuit jurisprudence, but the cases did not resolve (nor did
they purport to) many issues about the manner in which the doctrine should be
applied. In United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 69 the Fourth Circuit rendered a split
decision with Circuit Judge Roger Gregory making a spirited dissent about
alternate variance sentences both as applied in the case and generally.
Gomez-Jimenez was a consolidated appeal of two defendants convicted for
the same drug trafficking activity. At sentencing, defendants objected to the
factual predicates for several Guidelines enhancements, including possession of
a firearm during drug trafficking, the use of a minor, and occupying a leadership
role. 70 After hearing evidence put on by the government at the sentencing
hearing, the district court overruled the objections of both defendants to the
Guidelines calculations and ultimately sentenced them within the Guidelines
range to 180 and 390 months, respectively.' When pronouncing each sentence,
the district court expressly stated on the record that it would have imposed the
same sentence as an alternate variance sentence under the section 3553(a) factors
and directly cited to Savillon-Matute and Hargrove.72
On appeal, the defendants resumed their challenges to the Guidelines
calculations.
The Gomez-Jimenez majority looked to see whether the
increasingly familiar two requirements for alternate variance sentences had been
73
satisfied. As for knowledge that the district court would have reached the same
result, the majority had little trouble finding it was so informed. The district
court "expressly stated in a separate and particular explanation that it would have
reached the same result, specifically citing to Savillon-Matute, Hargrove, and its

67. Id.
68. See id. at 164-65.
69. United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2014).
70. Id. at 373.
71. Id. at 377.
72. Id. at 376-77 (citing United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Keene, 470
F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006)).
73. Interestingly, of the four Guidelines issues raised by the defendants on appeal, the
majority addressed two on the merits and only two through the alternate variance sentence. Id. at

383.
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review of the [section] 3553(a) factors." 74 Proceeding to the substantive
reasonableness analysis, the majority's review of the record showed "that, in
each case, the district court provided a thorough and persuasive [section] 3553(a)
analysis, carefully considering each of the defendant's arguments."
The
76
majority found no cause to declare the sentences substantively unreasonable.
Before concluding, the Gomez-Jimenez majority addressed-and predictably
rejected-an argument by defendants that the doctrine should only apply in cases
of above-Guidelines sentences and not to sentences such as theirs that were
within the Guidelines range.
The majority noted that harmless error review,
upon which the doctrine is predicated, "can apply to all claims of procedural
error at sentencing." 7 8 The majority observed that Savillon-Matute had adopted
the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Keene, which
too involved a within-Guidelines sentence. 79 All that mattered was the clear
indication from the district court that the advisory Guidelines were irrelevant to
the sentence and that the sentence was reasonable.so Accordingly, the majority
declined to cabin the doctrine only to sentences imposed above the Guidelines
range, recognizing the doctrine's significant breadth.
In dissent, Judge Gregory sharply departed from the majority's doctrinal
analysis as applied in Gomez-Jimenez and provided the first published arguments
from the Fourth Circuit against the doctrine generally.82
Judge Gregory disagreed that the panel possessed the requisite knowledge
that the district court would have imposed the same sentence despite the district
judge's explicit statement.83 For Judge Gregory, "a simple statement that the
court would have imposed the same sentence is [in]sufficient, at least where the
imposed sentence exceeds what would have been the Guidelines range absent the
procedural error." 84 Because the doctrine assumes the Guidelines range should
have been as defendants alleged, which here resulted in a within-Guidelines
sentence becoming an above-Guidelines sentence, Judge Gregory found that the
record lacked any additional justification for the alternate sentence above the
85
new, assumed Guidelines range.
Without a separate justification for the

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 384.
77. See id. at 384-85.
78. Id. at 385.
79. See id. Besides the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, others recognize the potential impact of
a district court's determination to impose a specific sentence regardless of a contested Guidelines
issue. See, e.g., United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387-88 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2013); United
States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 68 (2d Cir. 2009).
80. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 386.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 386-92 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. See id. at 389.
84. Id.
85. See id. Moreover, "[t]he absence of such justification for the alternative sentence cannot
be more at odds with the perception of fair justice." Id. at 390.
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variance sentence, a reviewing court could not assume that "the district court
would have imposed a sentence within the new [Guidelines] ranges just as it
imposed sentences within the erroneous ranges."86 Accordingly, the panel
"cannot be certain that [the district court] would have varied upward without
some appropriate and stated justification for doing so." 87
Stepping back, Judge Gregory criticized the doctrine broadly as unfaithful to
the two-step appellate review process established by the Supreme Court in
Gall. At the first step, the appellate court ensures the absence of significant
procedural errors, including Guidelines calculation errors. 89 But the doctrine's
prescription to treat Guidelines errors as harmless means that "any procedural
error may be ignored simply because the district court has asked us to ignore
it." 90 For Judge Gregory, the doctrine's formalized expansion of harmless error
analysis means that "[t]he exception has now swallowed the rule." 91
Because alternate variance sentences permit district courts to "err with
respect to any number of enhancements or calculations," the Circuit had
effectively "placed Gall in mothballs" and "abdicate[d] its responsibility to
meaningfully review sentences for procedural error." 92 Judge Gregory found
particularly "troubling" that the mere "combination of the district court's
statement and a one-sentence argument at the end of the government's brief'
brought about this abdication in Gomez-Jimenez. 93 Now, the Circuit would
engage in meaningful procedural reasonableness review, at least with respect to
alleged Guidelines errors, only when "a district court fails to cover its mistakes
with a few magic words." 94
Judge Gregory feared that the doctrine's ultimate effects would be a shift in
the judicial balance of power to the detriment of defendants.9 5 District courts
could rely on the doctrine to "prompt [the Fourth Circuit] to uphold a sentence
that otherwise lacks a sufficient justification."96 With that, "[t]he notion of
consistent sentences for similarly situated defendants disappears when errors

86. Id. at 390.
87. Id. Although Judge Gregory phrased his objection in terms of the doctrine's knowledge
requirement, it also sounds in the aspect of procedural reasonableness review that, apart from
correct Guidelines calculations, requires justification for a sentence that deviates from the
Guidelines. See supra note 25 and accompanying text
88. Seeid.at391.
89. Id. at 390 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)) (stating that without the
harmless error analysis, district courts would need to justify and explain their "unusually lenient or
unusually harsh" sentence as appropriate).
90. Id. at 391.
91. Id. at 390. Judge Gregory believed that alternate variance sentences should be employed
only "in extraordinary circumstances of constitutional importance." Id. at 391 n.7.
92. Id. at 391.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 392.
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IV. CURRENT STATE OF THE DOCTRINE

Since Savillon-Matute, the doctrine of alternate variance sentences has
featured in numerous cases. Many times the doctrine has controlled the Fourth
Circuit's sentencing analysis.98 Indeed, at least one Fourth Circuit judge has
written to "encourage district courts to consider announcing alternate sentences
in cases . . . where the guidelines calculation is disputed." 99 As such, the
doctrine remains a font of lively and important debate. This Part synthesizes
developments to present a comprehensive state of the doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly construed the threshold requirement of
"knowledge that the district court would have reached the same result even if it
had decided the [G]uidelines issue the other way."' 00 To possess the requisite
knowledge, the appellate court must be "'certain' that the result at sentencing
would have been the same" regardless of the Guidelines calculation.' 0 ' This
02
presents a "high bar" to establish "knowledge of an identical outcome.'
The court has consulted two main evidentiary sources to determine if the
knowledge requirement is satisfied: the record of the sentencing proceedings and
the sentence itself. Although there is "no requirement" for a sentencing court to
"specifically state that it would give the same sentence,"'1 03 the record must
reveal "something more than a review by the district court of the [section]
3553(a) factors ... particularly since an assessment of those factors is required at

97. Id.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Wals, 570 F. App'x 301, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(concluding that even if the calculation under the Guidelines was incorrect, the same sentence was
appropriate as a variance); United States v. Partman, 568 F. App'x 205, 213-14 (4th Cir. 2014)
(finding that the small degree of variance from the Guidelines range was appropriate under the
facts); United States v. Kim, 539 F. App'x 171, 175-76 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (concluding the
variance was not an abuse of discretion); United States v. Ecklin, 528 F. App'x 357, 366 (4th Cir.
2013) (determining that the sentence would have been the same had the Guidelines been decided in
the defendant's favor); United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 103 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding
the variance was reasonable).
99. United States v. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 357, 374 (4th Cir. 2013) (Shedd, J., dissenting).
100. United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing United States
v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006)).
101. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d at 370 (quoting United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194, 203 (4th
Cir. 2012)).
102. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d at 371.
103. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 124.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2015

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 13
1000

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 987

every sentencing."'1 04 Without that evidence in the record, the doctrine does not

apply. 105
What constitutes that "something more" has proven to be a case-specific
inquiry. The Fourth Circuit has found it in absolute, declarative statements by
the district court about the appropriateness of a specific sentence and the
irrelevance of a contested Guidelines issue.1 06 It also has exhibited itself through
a district court's express invocation of Savillon-Matute and Hargrove in
conjunction with a review of the section 3553(a) factors. 0 7
Besides statements on the record, the Fourth Circuit has looked to the
sentence itself to divine the district court's intent. The court has compared the
actual sentence selected to the calculated Guidelines range to gauge whether the
Guidelines impacted the district court's decision.08
Where it has found a
within-Guidelines sentence and a standard discussion of the section 3553(a)
factors, the court has declined to make assumptions about the district court's
motivation.1 09 In such a case, it would be difficult to establish knowledge

104. Montes-Flores,736 F.3d at 370. See Gomez, 690 F.3d at 203 ("Although the district court
did a commendable job in considering the 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a) factors in determining the sentence
that it would impose, we are unable to state with any certainty that it would have imposed the same
sentence had the sixteen-level enhancement not been in play.").

105. See United States v. Perez, 570 F. App'x 309, 312 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (noting
that the "record does not support the conclusion that [the defendant] would have received the same
sentences had the district not applied . . . its clearly erroneous [Guidelines] calculation"); United

States v. Napan, 484 F. App'x 780, 781 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (declining to apply doctrine
when district court erred in applying Guidelines enhancement and the record revealed only that the
district court gave "substantial downward variance from [the] Guidelines range and provided a
sufficient explanation for its chosen sentence").
106. See supra notes 32-33, 49 and accompanying text; United States v. Pearson, 596 F.

App'x 198, 199 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (finding knowledge satisfied where district court stated
at sentencing that disputed Guidelines issue "was not of any determining significance to me in my
analysis of the [§] 3553(a) factors. The sentence I have come to is the one that I think is appropriate,
even if I am wrong about [the Guidelines issue]"); see also United States v. Steele, 573 F. App'x
254, 255 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (observing that the sentencing court
"expressly indicated that it would have imposed a higher sentence if it had statutory authority to do
so").

107. See United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2014).
108. See Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 121, 122.
109. See Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d at 371 (concluding that "[w]here, as here, the district court
imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, we cannot assume (much less know) that the court, faced
with a much lower advisory range, would have varied upward" to reach the same sentence). At least
one Fourth Circuit judge, however, has postulated that even a within-Guidelines sentence by itself
could provide the requisite knowledge. Given the advisory nature of the Guidelines and a district
court's authority to vary below the Guidelines, Judge Shedd has suggested that a refusal to vary
downward makes it "apparent that the district court believed that nothing less than [the withinGuidelines sentence imposed] was appropriate." Id. at 373 (Shedd, J., dissenting). That approach is
likely too broad, particularly where the only indicia of knowledge are the standard discussion of the
section 3553(a) factors and a within-Guidelines sentence. Rather than relieve the burden of a
potential resentencing, applying the doctrine in such a circumstance arguably burdens district judges
who would be willing to resentence a defendant in light of an erroneous Guidelines calculation to

say so on the record. See United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 775 (11th Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J.,
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"because it is logical to assume that if a district court is content to sentence
within whatever the guidelines range happens to be, then a lower range would
lead to a sentence within that lower range."" 0 However, a sentence substantially
above (or below) the Guidelines range can indicate the district court's sentence
was steered by considerations beyond the Guidelines, and as such, any possible
error in calculating the Guidelines would be irrelevant."'
When satisfied of its knowledge that a challenged Guidelines issue did not
drive the district court's sentence, the Fourth Circuit moves to substantive
reasonableness.1 2 At this step, the court makes "a determination [whether] the
sentence would be reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in
the defendant's favor."1 3 The standard precepts of substantive reasonableness
review apply to this determination. Most alternate sentences have been affirmed,
consistent with the nationally high rates of affirmance as substantively
reasonable.11 4 However, in light of Judge Gregory's concern that alternate
variance sentences would be used to manipulate the appellate court into
affirming a sentence it would not have otherwise,'' 5 it is important to note that
the Fourth Circuit has vacated alternate sentences as substantively
unreasonable.116

concurring) (noting, when first proposing the doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit, that "nothing . . is
meant to imply that a district court is not free to decide a disputed guidelines issue without
mentioning, or even considering, whether the result of that decision actually affects the sentence it
imposes following consideration of the [section] 3553(a) factors").
110. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d at 372 (Shedd, J., dissenting).
111. See United States v. Artis, 554 F. App'x 220, 222 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(considering for knowledge that the district court imposed an upward variance of 263% from the
Guidelines range); United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 122 & n.4, 124 (4th Cir. 2011)
(considering for knowledge that the district court imposed a 36-month sentence, which was two to
three times that called for by the advisory Guidelines range calculated at sentencing).
112. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
113. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 123 (quoting United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349
(1Ith Cir. 2006)).
114. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS Table 59 (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default
/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table59.pdf
(providing
statistics for fiscal year 2013 about national affirmance rates for substantive reasonableness).
115. See supra notes 96-97.
116. See United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 529 n.8 (4th Cir. 2014) (vacating sentence as
substantively unreasonable and noting that "the district court's explanation that it would have
imposed the same sentence as a variant sentence even if it were determined that its upward
departure . . .was an abuse of discretion does not alter our analysis of the substantive
reasonableness of Howard's life-plus-sixty-months sentence"); United States v. Baker, 539 F.
App'x 299, 306 (4th Cir. 2013) (vacating sentence, despite the district court's specific invocation of
Savillon-Matute, because the court determined there were Guidelines calculation errors at
sentencing such that it "cannot say that the life sentence imposed by the district court is
reasonable . . . on the record before us").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2015

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 13
1002
V.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 987

NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

This Part explores several normative issues implicated by alternate variance
sentences-meaning and effect of the Guidelines, judicial balance of power, and
a desire for efficiency and situates them within broader jurisprudential debates.
In so doing, this Part addresses how these normative factors might weigh in
favor of or against the doctrine.
A.

Meaning and Effect of the Guidelines
1.

Engagement by the DistrictandAppellate Court with the Guidelines

One possible concern about the doctrine's expansion is that district courts
will give short shrift to calculating the Guidelines range, or may even manipulate
the calculation to achieve a desired sentencing outcome." 7 However, the
doctrine "does not allow district courts to ignore their responsibility to consider
the [G]uidelines in a meaningful manner."" 8 Beyond the Fourth Circuit's
declaration that district courts will meaningfully consider the Guidelines even
when they announce an alternate sentence-and implicitly that it may reverse if
such consideration was not given-district courts already are obligated by
section 3553(a) to engage with the Guidelines.11 9 Judges generally can be
counted on to take their statutory responsibilities seriously. On balance, the
doctrine's treatment of the Guidelines appears consistent with the subtle but
crucial distinction that although "[a] court must consider" the Guidelines, postBooker it only "may be influenced" by them, or it may not.120
At the appellate level, the worry is the potential stagnation of Guidelines
"law," for lack of a better term. Since their promulgation, appellate courts have
interpreted the language and scope of Guidelines provisions, much as they do
with statutes.121
By assuming without deciding outcomes in contested
Guidelines issues, the doctrine reduces the opportunities for the Fourth Circuit to
engage in Guidelines interpretation.
The precise import of this reduction
remains to be seen. After all, it does not necessarily mean that the Circuit will
never resolve a specific question of Guidelines interpretation; it only may have
to wait for a subsequent case that does not present an alternate variance sentence.

117. In his Gomez-Jimenez dissent, Judge Gregory expressed a concern about the latter. See
United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 392 (4th Cir. 2014) (Gregory, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
118. United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 163 (4th Cir. 2012).
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2012).
120. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Santos, 184 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We use
basic statutory construction rules when interpreting the Guidelines.").
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Indeed, the Guidelines issue elided by the Fourth Circuit in Savillon-Matute was
subsequently decided by the court.122

2.

"Anchoring" Effect

Another concern with the doctrine is its tolerance for the district court's
formulation of a sentence that may be influenced, at least subconsciously, by a
potentially erroneous Guidelines range. This concern is best viewed through the
lens of the "anchoring" effect, a cognitive bias in which a decision-maker
"overreli[es] on an initial numerical reference point" when determining an
appropriate final judgment.1 23 In the sentencing context, the anchoring effect
would manifest through "judges irrationally assign[ing] too much weight to the
[G]uideline range, just because it offers some initial numbers." 24 Many,
including federal judges, subscribe to the Guidelines' potential anchoring
effect.125 And the Fourth Circuit has recognized the potential downstream
effects that an erroneous Guidelines calculation could have on the ultimate
sentence. 126
At first glance, the doctrine might appear to bake in any anchoring effects
because it does not correct asserted Guidelines errors. However, "judges do not
approach sentencing thinking about a single set of 'anchor' numbers-the
[G]uideline minimum and maximum-but with multiple numbers from various
sources."127 These other sources, which include the arguments of counsel,
victim testimony, the judge's own experience in sentencing prior defendants, and
consideration of all the factors set forth in section 3553(a), can prove more

122. Compare United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining
to resolve the categorical status of a Maryland second-degree assault conviction), with United States
v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 340-42 (4th Cir. 2013) (resolving the status of a Maryland second-degree
assault conviction); Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 567-70 (4th Cir. 2013) (same).
123. Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426, 439 (2011)
(quoting Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant
Anchors on Experts'JudicialDecision Making, 32 PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 188 (2006)).
124. Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing DisparityAfter Booker: A FirstLook, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 45 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2013) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (discussing how anchoring would influence a district judge's selection of a sentence);
Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 137, 138 (2006) ("In effect, the 300-odd page Guideline Manual provides ready-made
anchors."); Jed S. Rakoff, Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should Be Scrapped, 26 FED.
SENT'G REP. 6, 8 (2013) ("[E]ven after Booker, the very first thing a judge is still required to do at
sentencing is to calculate the Guidelines range, and that creates a kind of psychological presumption
from which most judges are hesitant to deviate too far.").
126. See United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)) ("An error in the
calculation of the applicable Guidelines range, whether an error of fact or of law, infects all that
follows at the sentencing proceeding, including the ultimate sentence chosen by the district
court. . . .").
127. Scott, supra note 124, at 46.
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persuasive than the Guidelines range.128 Post-Booker, district judges are
required to consider all of the sentencing factors, of which the Guidelines are
one, but are committed with the discretion to select a sentence driven by factors
other than the Guidelines.129 In that instance, which is the prototypical doctrinal
scenario, one would be harder pressed to identify significant ill effects of
anchoring because the district court is expressly disclaiming the importance of
the Guidelines. Thus, the very nature of alternate variance sentences appears to
mitigate in large part if not entirely-any anchoring effects.
B. JudicialBalance ofPower Over Sentencing
The Fourth Circuit's alternate variance sentence cases highlight, and indeed
test the boundaries, of a larger struggle post-Booker between the district and
appellate courts about the proper balance of power over sentencing.1 30 The
Supreme Court has recognized, as echoed by the Fourth Circuit, the prominence
of district courts to the sentencing process based on their unique institutional
capabilities.1 31 By hearing first-hand the evidence and arguments presented
during sentencing and seeing the defendant face-to-face, the sentencing court is
more familiar with an individual defendant than any appellate panel.132 This
leaves the sentencing judge "in a superior position to find facts and judge their
import under [section] 3553(a)."133 With these facts, the district court is to

128. See, e.g., Ingram, 721 F.3d at 49-50 & n.7 (Raggi, J., concurring) (contending that
district judges, even when sentencing outside the Guidelines, are not irrationally influenced by the
anchoring effect); Scott, supra note 124, at 46 (arguing that "to the extent the guideline range
operates as an irrational 'anchor' just because it supplies some initial numbers, its effects likely are
offset by other anchors tugging in different directions").
129. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1241 (2011) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.
at 49, 51) (reaffirming that the district court must give "appropriate consideration of all of the
factors listed in [section] 3553(a)"); Rakoff, supra note 125, at 8 ("There have been some judges,
however, who have taken more seriously the message of Booker, and of Section 3553(a) of the U.S.
Criminal Code, that the Guidelines are just one of many factors to be considered at sentencing.").
130. See D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance? FederalDistrict CourtDiscretion and Appellate
Review Six Years After Booker, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 641, 642 (2011) (observing that since Booker,
"federal courts have been faced with the challenge of balancing newfound district court discretion
with the need to maintain consistent and predictable appellate review of sentencing decisions");
Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretionand Sentencing After Booker, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115,
1117-18 (2008) (noting that since Booker "[w]hat was predicted to be a struggle for power between
the Sentencing Commission and the district courts has instead become a struggle between discretion
in the courts of appeals and deference to the district courts").
131. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 52) (discussing Supreme Court precedent requiring deference to the district court's
assessment of the proper sentence).
132. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357-58 (2007); see also id. at 351 (noting that
"the sentencing court subjects the defendant's sentence to the thorough adversarial testing
contemplated by federal sentencing procedure").
133. Gall, 552 U.S. at 52 (quoting Brief for Federal Public and Community Defenders et al. as
Amici Curiae at 17, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (No. 06-7949), 2007 WL 2197511 at
* 16).
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"make an individualized assessment"', 3 4 and determine the sentence that is
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary."1 35 That assessment may lead the
district court in its discretion to select a sentence that may be within or outside
the advisory Guidelines range. And even if the district court selects a sentence
outside the Guidelines range, it is entitled to the same "due deference" on review
as any other sentence. 136
When announcing alternate variance sentences, district courts exercise their
discretionary prerogative under section 3553(a) and disclaim that the advisory
Guidelines range mattered to their ultimate determinations. 137 As a result, the
district court signals to the Circuit that at least the aspect of procedural
reasonableness review related to Guidelines errors is unnecessary.13 8 And
provided the doctrinal conditions are met, the Fourth Circuit has agreed to
truncate its own review process.139
One could argue, as did Judge Gregory forcefully in Gomez-Jimenez, that
through the doctrine, the Circuit inappropriately abandons the procedural review
mandated by the Supreme Court.1 40 The Supreme Court specifically defined
procedural reasonableness not to include "failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range,"'141 and the Circuit should not fail to undertake
that review and require accurate Guidelines calculations.1 42 In so doing, the
Circuit can carry 43
out "its responsibility to meaningfully review sentences for
procedural error."'1

Beyond fulfilling the Supreme Court's expectations about appellate review,
the Circuit should not abandon aspects of its procedural reasonableness review
because it already has relatively few sentencing review tools in its belt. 144 The
doctrine would subtly but significantly shift the judicial balance of power over
sentencing further in favor of district courts. A district court, acting purposefully
with an eye on the doctrinal requirements, can insulate its Guidelines calculation

134. Id. at 50.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
136. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
137. See generally id. at 50 (explaining how district courts must make an "individualized
assessment" of reasonableness and must only use the Guidelines as "a starting point").
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123-24 (4th Cir. 2011)
(declining to resolve alleged procedural error and moving on to substantive reasonableness review).
140. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
141. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
142. See United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193, 201 (4th Cir. 2010) ("Because our standard of
review is defined at least in part by reference to the advisory Guidelines range, it is unsurprising
that we have required the sentencing courts to be faithful to the Guidelines in calculating that
range.").
143. See United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 391 (4th Cir. 2014) (Gregory, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. See Fisher, supra note 130, at 672 ("As one of the last lines of defense against unwanted
sentencing disparities and the developers of the larger body of sentencing law, the courts of appeals
must embrace the tools that the Supreme Court has given them to ensure that district courts continue
to exercise guided discretion.").
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rulings from review and manipulate the process "to justify reaching the sentence
[it] desire[s].' 45 At least in the view of Judge Gregory, that power shift comes
at the expense only of "a few magic words." 46
There are several possible responses to any troubled by the doctrine. First,
far from ignoring the Supreme Court's sentencing mandates, the doctrine
expressly rests upon the Supreme Court's harmlessness jurisprudence.1 47
Second, as for the concern about district courts using the doctrine to manipulate
the process towards a desired sentencing outcome, district courts already possess
the authority to impose a sentence irrespective of the advisory Guidelines
range.1 48 In other words, district courts need not jigger the Guidelines numbers
when they could simply exercise their discretionary authority under section
3553(a) to sentence outside the Guidelines.149 And far from abusing this power
post-Booker, district judges generally "have responded
to the increase in their
50
discretionary authority with restraint and moderation."',
Third, the doctrine does not leave the appellate court without recourse to
vacate an unreasonable sentence. 15' After all, the doctrine only elides procedural
reasonableness review, but the sentence in question still must survive substantive
reasonableness review.152 Substantive reasonableness cuts to the quick of the
matter and permits the appellate court to determine "whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the
standards set forth in [section] 3553(a)."153 Far from a guaranteed affirmance,

145. See Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 392 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
146. Id. at 391.
147. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
149. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 51 Hous. L. REV. 1227, 1232-34 (2014) ("In practical fact, district court
judges are now at liberty to adhere to or ignore guideline ranges as the spirit moves them, subject
only to the requirement that a sentence outside the range be accompanied by some explanation
which (a) is couched in the gloriously inclusive terminology of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and (b) is not
on its face barking mad.") (citations omitted).
150. Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1742 (2012);
see also Bowman, supra note 149, at 1250 (observing that "for three of the four most common case
types in federal court, the system seems to be in rough equilibrium, comfortable with imposing
sentences at a modest and fairly standard discount from the sentences called for by the Guidelines
and producing average sentences only fractionally lower than those imposed before Booker.").
151. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 38.
152. Id.
153. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d at 216; see also Fisher, supra note 130, at 673 (urging that
courts of appeals should not shy from "difficult questions related to . . . substantive reasonableness"
because the courts will "reduce problems associated with sentencing disparity at the district court
level, [and] also begin to build and strengthen a more consistent and reliable definition of
substantive reasonableness"); Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines (And Judges Be
Judges), OSCJL Amici: Views from the Field 5 (Jan. 2008), http://osjclblogspot.com ("If we are
going to let (district) judges be judges, and trust them to exercise the necessary discretion with
sensitivity to the need for coherent sentencing policy, so we should let (appellate) judges be judges
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the Circuit has vacated sentences as substantively unreasonable even when the
district court announced an alternate sentence.1 54
Fourth, to the extent the Circuit becomes concerned that district courts are
using the doctrine to brush aside the Guidelines, it may always bolster the
amount of explanation a district court must provide to justify a sentence. The
Fourth Circuit generally prefers more fulsome justifications at sentencing.1 5 5 As
we have seen, to be triggered, the doctrine already requires that the district court
indicate "something more" than an analysis of the section 3553(a).156 A district
court convinced of the necessity of a particular sentence and wishing to avail
itself of the doctrine should have little trouble taking a few more minutes to
explain its decision on the record and why any particular contested Guidelines
issues were irrelevant. A slightly longer sentencing hearing is a bargain
compared to a remand for resentencing. The additional explanation can only
redound to the benefit of the reviewing court,157 the defendant,

and even

policymakers.159

C. Efficiency Gains
As discussed above, the stated goal of the doctrine's proponents is greater
efficiency in the form of streamlined sentencing appeals and the avoidance of
unnecessary remands for resentencing.1 60 This goal serves the need for appellate
courts to manage a caseload that leaves them "overburdened" and without "the
ability to give each case full attention"161-to say nothing of the mirrored need at

as well, performing their traditional function of reining in excess and gradually developing a
'common law' of what is and is not sensible.").
154. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 581-85 (4th Cir. 2010) (vacating
sentences for inadequate explanation).
156. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (citing Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356-58 (2007)) (requiring district courts to "adequately explain the chosen sentence to
allow for meaningful appellate review").
158. See, e.g., Rita, 551 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I think the judge's statement to
the defendant, made at the time of sentencing, is an especially important part of the criminal
process. If the defendant is convinced that justice has been done in his case that society has dealt
with him fairly the likelihood of his successful rehabilitation will surely be enhanced.").
159. See Michael O'Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 484 (2009)
(suggesting that policymakers responsible for Guidelines development would benefit from having
district judges "think more carefully about individual cases in light of their experiences in
sentencing many other cases, and draw explicit connections between their personal insights and the
[section] 3553(a) factors" and put it on the record).
160. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
161. Marin K. Levy, JudicialAttention As A Scarce Resource: A PreliminaryDefense of How
Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401,
409 (2013). In that sense, the doctrine is an actualization of a desire expressed by many to find ways
"to help the circuit courts run faster." Id. at 412.
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the district court level.162 It also is in accord with the Fourth Circuit's oftvacate sentences when doing so "would be a pointless
expressed desire to not
63
waste of resources."'1

Three observations related to the use of the doctrine as a means to increase
efficiency are worth making. The first is the likely unbridgeable divide between
Fourth Circuit judges about the extent to which the Circuit should go out of its
way to encourage the doctrine's use by district courts.164 Second, the efficiency

rationale is greatly diminished when the Circuit uses the doctrine as alternate
grounds for affirming a sentence, after it has already resolved the contested
Guidelines issue.165 Third, the Circuit has not yet addressed the doctrine's
potentially far-reaching consequences in post-conviction proceedings, in which
the doctrine may foreclose arguments by defendants seeking relief based on
erroneous calculations of or subsequent changes to the Guidelines because the
Guidelines were irrelevant to the sentence.1 66
VI. CONCLUSION

The foundation and expansion of the doctrine of alternate variance sentences
is a key development in Fourth Circuit sentencing jurisprudence. Although the
advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines remain at the procedural heart of the
sentencing process, district courts possess the statutory discretion to impose
sentences for which the Guidelines range may have been immaterial to the
ultimate decision. The doctrine recognizes the district court's discretion by
providing a pathway for streamlined appellate review of sentences that holds
harmless any possible errors in calculating the advisory Guidelines range.
Through its increasingly frequent use, the doctrine promises to have a significant

162. For instance, in 2013, there were only 602 active and 346 senior federal district court
judges. Administrative Office of the Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures 2013 tbl. 1.1,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2013/Table101.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2015), and 386,781 civil and criminal cases pending in the district court. See
Administrative Office of the Courts, Judicial Caseload Indicators: 12-Month Periods Ending
March
31,
2005,
2010,
2013,
and
2014,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload-statistics-20 14/judicial-caseload-indicators.aspx
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2015).
163. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 2010).
164. Compare United States v. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 357, 374 (4th Cir. 2013) (Shedd, J.,
dissenting) (encouraging "district courts to consider announcing alternate sentences in
cases . . . where the guidelines calculation is disputed," in part, "to obviate the additional time and
expense that a resentencing remand would require"), with United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750
F.3d 370, 391 n.7 (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("I would hesitate to encourage alternative sentences.").
165. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 542 F. App'x 283, 288 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(applying the doctrine as alternate reasoning to affirm a sentence after resolving defendant's
Guidelines challenge on the merits).
166. See, e.g., United States v. King, No. 1:08CR00041, 2014 WL 1906695, at *16, *17
(W.D. Va. May 13, 2014) (applying the doctrine in post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel); McGaha v. United States, No. 7:09-CR-131-D, 7:12-CV-68-D, 2013 WL 2418129, at
*4 (E.D.N.C. June 3, 2013) (applying the doctrine in post-conviction motion to vacate sentence).
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impact on all actors involved in the federal sentencing process and remain an
active source of judicial debate.
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